

Abstract
Private technology companies now exercise operational influence in armed conflict, e.g., through control of digital infrastructure, satellite connectivity, artificial intelligence systems, cybersecurity and cloud computing networks that states rely on during hostilities. Existing legal frameworks, such as public international law and corporate social responsibility frameworks, appear institutionally unprepared for this reality, which exposes an uncomfortable concentration of strategic authority in private entities that were never designed to exercise war-related power.

The private tech company controversy
Private technology companies now wield operational influence in armed conflict that many states once considered an exclusive sovereign power. Decisions taken inside corporate boardrooms can affect military capability during active hostilities. Law has not fully caught up with this reality, yet the consequences are already visible in current world conflicts.
Public international law was designed with states and armed forces in mind; however, the legal framework governing armed conflict already contains rules that extend far beyond uniformed combatants. The rules contained under article 52 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions establish that objects become military objectives when they make an effective contribution to military action and when their destruction offers a definite military advantage.
Modern digital infrastructure exists directly within that legal logic. Corporate satellite networks, private intelligence platforms, and cloud computing systems can become operational components within a conflict environment even though they remain privately owned.
Technology companies therefore operate in a complex legal and political space where corporate decisions intersect with international humanitarian law, sanctions regulations, and corporate social responsibility.
When a private technology company decides who gets connectivity, cloud computing, satellite imagery, or defensive cyber services during an armed conflict, that company is not merely providing a service; it is exercising a form of power that can affect military operations and diplomatic outcomes.
Existing laws already have mechanisms that can treat parts of that conduct as connected to the conflict.
The argument that the law does not already label technology firms as belligerents, because international humanitarian law still distinguishes civilians from combatants and civilian objects from military objectives. The law still treats civilian protection as the default.
However, the law is also clear that effects and contributions matter, and business and human rights standards likewise focus on adverse impacts and due diligence rather than on corporate self-description.

The private capabilities that now steer conflict
Let us reflect on commercial satellite connectivity. In plain terms, the same terminals and network can connect civilian services and also carry command communications, drone video, and targeting-related data. It was reported in June 2023 that the United States Department of Defense purchased satellite communications services from Starlink for Ukraine, and it was later reported in July 2025 that a global Starlink outage disrupted Ukrainian military communications, which is a reminder that dependence on a single private network can become an operational reality.

