Editorial: Save Quantum Computing From Regulation
Premature regulation of quantum computing stifles innovation; governments should adopt flexible, targeted governance, support international cooperation, and voluntary standards instead.
The drive to regulate quantum computing reveals a profound tension between legitimate security concerns and the need for scientific freedom, exposing how the wrong policy decisions could either hinder a transformative technology or fail to address genuine risks. Advocates and critics alike often oversimplify the debate, ignoring the complex issues of international collaboration, nascent research, and geopolitical interests that define this contentious subject.
In this newsletter, we will cover:
Quantum computing is still in its infancy; imposing regulations risks choking off international collaboration, supply chains and the scientific freedom that has driven technological breakthroughs.
Export controls and classifications hinder research by slowing equipment imports, compliance costs and greatly discouraging foreign partnerships needed for quantum companies and laboratories to thrive.
Security concerns are valid but should be addressed through targeted measures and quantum cryptography standards than sweeping regulations that slow innovation and harm legitimate research.
Standards bodies like ISO, IEC and NIST provide flexible frameworks for terminology, interoperability and security that evolve with quantum technologies without imposing rigid, obsolete mandates.
Policymakers should invest in research, education and collaboration, adopting application specific oversight rather than broad prohibitions to protect national security while promoting quantum innovation sustainably.
The Demerits of Quantum Computing Regulation
The controversial debate over whether quantum computing should be regulated has become increasingly intense as governments, industry leaders and commentators grapple with the implications of this emerging technology.
On one side stand those who argue that quantum computers and related technologies pose profound security and economic risks that justify pre‑emptive regulation; on the other side are those who believe that premature regulation will stifle innovation, fragment global research networks and undermine the potential benefits that quantum technologies promise.
This editorial aligns with the latter view, arguing that the current push to regulate quantum computing is misguided, grounded in a distorted perception of risk, and driven by motives that have little to do with safeguarding innovation or national security.
Drawing on a range of academic research, policy analyses and government reports, this editorial critically examines the arguments for regulation and highlights the dangers of a regulatory rush.
There is the question of whether quantum computing is sufficiently mature to warrant legal and economic controls.
Quantum technologies remain at an early stage; most devices are experimental, and their capabilities are limited to specific problems.
Yet, some policymakers have moved to classify quantum computers as critical technologies and impose export controls on their components.
In the United States, the Department of Commerce extended export controls to quantum computing and other emerging technologies in 2024, requiring companies to obtain licenses when selling or transferring quantum hardware, software or services.
The official justification was national security: regulators fear that countries like China might use advanced quantum systems to break encryption and gain military advantages.
However, this justification rests on speculative scenarios rather than present realities.
As the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) notes, quantum computers capable of performing such decryption are still many years away, and overbroad restrictions risk cutting off U.S. companies from international research networks and markets.
The consequences of misclassifying quantum computing as a mature, high‑risk technology are immediate and far‑reaching.
Export controls, by design, restrict the flow of hardware, software and knowledge across borders.
For quantum research, which relies on globally distributed expertise and equipment, such restrictions are particularly harmful.
A panel discussion at the recently emphasised that quantum laboratories depend on cryogenics, photonics and other components sourced from multiple countries.
When governments treat these instruments as strategic commodities, they risk creating choke points that disrupt supply chains, increase costs and delay research.
Critics of export controls argue that rather than preventing adversaries from obtaining quantum technology, such measures primarily impede legitimate scientific collaboration, harming domestic companies while encouraging foreign competitors to build parallel supply chains.
These regulatory interventions also undermine academic and commercial collaboration in quantum research.
Aziz Huq, a constitutional law scholar, has argued that export controls focus on restricting the flow of ideas, capital and goods across borders rather than building the infrastructure and norms needed to leverage innovation for national benefit.
By placing hardware and research data under the same restrictions as military equipment, policymakers fail to recognise that innovation flourishes through open exchange.
The result is a chilling effect: universities hesitate to partner with foreign institutions, startups struggle to secure funding and cross‑border projects are postponed or cancelled.
In the name of national security, regulators may be inadvertently weakening their own countries’ positions in the global quantum race.
The United Kingdom’s Regulatory Horizons Council (RHC) has taken a different approach, one that emphasises caution and proportion.
In a February 2024 report, the RHC noted that quantum technologies are at various stages of development and argued that it is too early to jump to legally based regulation.
The report acknowledged that discussions and planning are necessary but cautioned against imposing rules before the applications and risks are fully understood.
The UK government’s response agreed, stating that regulation must be introduced at the right time so that it supports rather than stifles innovation.
This measured stance stands in stark contrast to the regulatory zeal seen in other regions, suggesting that effective governance can be more nuanced and less reactive.
Academics who study export controls and innovation policy share the RHC’s concerns.
Anh Nguyen of the University of Amsterdam has argued that current quantum export control proposals are unprecedented attempts to restrict a future technology and that performance thresholds used to trigger controls often exceed the capabilities of existing devices.
Nguyen and others warn that overbroad restrictions risk creating regulatory choke points and weakening global research networks.
Therefore, by treating quantum components like conventional dual‑use items, policymakers ignore the fact that many parts of quantum systems have purely civilian or benign applications.
For example, precision lasers used in quantum experiments are also used in medical diagnostics and manufacturing; cryogenic systems are essential for high‑energy physics and neuroscience. Classifying these items as strategic risks freezing entire sectors.
Think tanks and policy institutes provide further evidence that regulation could backfire.
A 2022 RAND Corporation report recommended that policymakers should not impose export controls on quantum computers or communications systems, noting that the eventual applications and timelines are highly uncertain and that restrictions could limit the exchange of ideas and slow technological progress.
The CSIS has echoed this view, highlighting that overly restrictive technology transfer policies would cut off access to the global quantum research community and harm startups.
These analyses share a common conclusion: premature regulation threatens to undermine innovation and leadership more than it protects security.
The debate is not confined to the United States and the United Kingdom alone.
In Europe, the drive for digital sovereignty has spurred proposals to create a “Quantum Act” that would place quantum computing under a regulatory regime similar to other critical infrastructures.
The European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) has criticised this approach, pointing out that quantum technologies have emerged from global scientific interdependence and that regulation can support innovation only when grounded in a clear understanding of how a technology is likely to develop.
The authors warn that Europe risks stifling its own industry by over regulating too early and argue that a coordinated effort should allow member states to cultivate strengths in their own domains.
Overly prescriptive legislation for quantum computing could lead to uneven enforcement and further fragmentation,
These concerns are compounded by the fact that almost every key component of a quantum computer is sourced internationally.
Trying to build a fully domestic supply chain is unrealistic and could isolate Europe from global innovation.
Voluntary international standards offer the most promising framework for governing quantum technologies.
According to this view, standards bodies such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) are already developing frameworks for terminology, interoperability, security and risk management.
These standards are faster to update than laws, apply across borders and provide shared benchmarks without imposing legal mandates.
They build trust, reduce ambiguity and lay a foundation for eventual regulation without stifling innovation during early development.
Standardisation efforts are already yielding tangible results.
The ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee on Quantum Technologies, established in 2024, coordinates terminology, benchmarks and interoperability standards across the quantum ecosystem.
NIST has finalised Federal Information Processing Standards that specify algorithms designed to resist attacks from quantum computers.
These standards enable organisations to prepare for quantum risks without the need for sweeping legislative action.
They also foster international collaboration, providing a common language and set of expectations for researchers, developers and regulators.
This standards‑first approach is a pragmatic alternative to immediate regulation, offering flexibility and adaptability as the technology evolves.
The U.K. Regulatory Horizons Council’s recommendation of a “regulation by application” model aligns with the standards‑first perspective.
It proposes that regulators focus on specific use cases rather than imposing blanket rules across the entire quantum domain. Under this model, legislation would apply only when a technology’s applications are clearly understood and when risks are concrete and measurable.
The U.K. government’s response supports this approach, emphasising that discussions, upskilling and international standardisation should precede any legislative requirements.
By upskilling regulators and engaging with industry through forums and workshops, governments can ensure that regulatory interventions are informed, targeted and proportionate.
Critics of regulation also stress the importance of international cooperation.
The Chicago Quantum Exchange event highlighted existing partnerships between the United States, Japan, France and Switzerland, underscoring that cross‑border collaboration is essential for quantum progress.
Scholars argue that building solid infrastructure and shared norms is crucial for nations to derive economic benefits from quantum innovation.
These norms include commitments to responsible research, ethical standards and open exchange of knowledge.
Targeted controls on malicious use cases may be necessary for national security, but blanket regulations would cut researchers off from the global ecosystem.
For innovation to flourish, governments must foster, not inhibit, these international networks.
Proponents of immediate regulation often portray critics as naive or indifferent to security concerns.
Such characterisations are unfair and ignore the fact that targeted measures are already in place.
The argument for regulation also often conflates worst‑case scenarios with imminent threats.
The possibility that quantum computers might one day break classical encryption does not justify imposing controls on research equipment or software today.
As RAND and CSIS highlight, the timeline for practical, scalable quantum computers remains uncertain.
Even if quantum computers eventually pose a security threat, the appropriate response is not to restrict research but to accelerate the development of quantum‑resistant cryptography and security practices.
Therefore, by investing in mitigation strategies and adaptive governance, policymakers can prepare for the quantum future without hampering innovation.
Economic considerations further undermine the case for regulation.
Quantum technologies are expected to create new industries and markets, driving job growth and attracting investment.
Restrictive regulation could deter venture capital and corporate investment, as companies may perceive a hostile environment for quantum research. In contrast, countries that adopt supportive, flexible policies are likely to attract talent and capital.
The CSIS report emphasises the need to increase support for research through funding, tax incentives and programs that nurture startups.
It calls for bolstering technological cooperation with allies and developing common policies on technology transfer to avoid cutting off access to the global research community.
These recommendations highlight that economic leadership in quantum technologies requires openness and collaboration, not isolation and control.
The ethical dimension of quantum regulation cannot be ignored.
Quantum technologies have the potential to revolutionise medicine, climate science, finance and logistics.
They could enable early detection of diseases, optimise supply chains and model complex chemical reactions.
Premature regulation that delays these innovations is not merely a missed economic opportunity; it is an ethical failure.
When policymakers restrict research based on speculative fears, they risk denying society the benefits that quantum computing could bring.
Given the urgency of global challenges, pandemics, climate change, resource management, the responsible course is to encourage research while putting in place mechanisms to address specific risks as they arise.
In the final analysis, the case against regulating quantum computing at this stage is compelling.
The technology is still maturing, and its capabilities and risks remain uncertain.
National security concerns, while legitimate, are better addressed through targeted measures, investment in cryptographic resilience and international cooperation than through sweeping export controls.
The misclassification of quantum hardware as inherently dual use ignores the civilian applications of many components and disrupts supply chains.
In conclusion, regulating quantum computing now would be a mistake.
The risks that proponents of regulation highlight are real but speculative and can be mitigated through targeted, flexible approaches.
Sweeping controls on components and knowledge threaten to undermine the global research collaborations that drive innovation and could delay the development of applications with enormous social and economic benefits.
Governments should resist the impulse to regulate for regulation’s sake. Instead, they should invest in research, support standardisation, engage with international partners and apply regulation only when applications and risks are clearly understood.
If you have thoughts or experiences on this debate, I welcome your contributions; please share your perspective, questions, or critiques; civil discourse enriches understanding and helps ensure policies are informed by diverse voices and informed analysis and encourages thoughtful engagement.
It is fascinating to see how early we are in the journey toward practical quantum computers and how much of this work depends on cross‑border collaboration. Most of the devices you hear about in the news are prototypes used by researchers exploring fundamental physics, and they draw on a truly global supply chain: cryogenic systems from Europe, lasers from Japan, software from the United States. Because of this interdependence, sweeping regulations, like classifying quantum devices as strategic assets and requiring licences for every transaction, could end up harming the very people who are driving innovation. It is worth remembering that some of the most celebrated scientific breakthroughs happened because scientists had the freedom to share ideas and components freely across borders. The lesson here is that protecting national interests and supporting budding technologies is not about building walls around laboratories; it is about nurturing the networks that sustain them and giving researchers room to experiment.