Editorial: The Legal Consequences of Dark Web Monitoring

Dark web monitoring can expose serious legal risks that threaten your security, privacy, and compliance.

Dark web monitoring is praised as a powerful tool for uncovering cyber threats, yet it walks a fine line with the law. Some techniques risk breaching privacy rules or crossing into illegal territory. This editorial explores the legal boundaries that everyone should know.

In this newsletter editorial, we will cover:

1. The hidden legal traps of dark web monitoring: From GDPR pitfalls to the Computer Misuse Act, discover the laws that could turn a well-meaning cybersecurity scan into a costly legal nightmare.

2. How law enforcement monitors the dark web: Explore the Investigatory Powers Act, surveillance warrants, and global treaties like the Budapest Convention that govern dark web intelligence across borders.

3. When intelligence gathering becomes illegal: Learn the fine line between proactive cyber defence and unauthorised access, and how crossing it could invite criminal charges or regulatory sanctions.

4. Enforcement trends: Recent investigations, prosecutions, and corporate missteps to understand how regulators and courts are applying the rules for cyber threat intelligence in 2025.

5. A compliance-first strategy for tech professionals: Gain actionable steps, risk-mitigation tactics, and governance frameworks to legally conduct dark web monitoring while protecting your organisation’s reputation and avoiding legal problems.

Dark Web Monitoring

Dark web monitoring is sold as cybersecurity’s secret weapon, yet too often it tiptoes past legality, blurring the line between protection and prosecution in ways few dare to admit.

In the mid‑1990s, researchers working for the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory developed The Onion Router (Tor) to conceal the routing of sensitive communications.

When Tor was released to the public, a subterranean layer of the Internet, now known as the dark web, began to flourish.

The dark web consists of services reachable only through specialised tools such as Tor or I2P and is intentionally hidden from search engines.

Simply accessing the dark web is not illegal; however, activities such as trading stolen credit card numbers or purchasing weapons can lead to criminal prosecution.

Despite its notoriety, the dark web also serves legitimate purposes: it provides safe channels for journalists and whistleblowers operating under repressive regimes and enables privacy-centric communications.

When organisations seek to protect their brands, customers and intellectual property, they can invest in dark web monitoring.

Tools and services scan hidden forums, marketplaces and chat rooms for stolen credentials, leaked data and chatter about upcoming exploits.

Yet, the very act of monitoring these spaces raises questions about privacy, unauthorised access and cross‑border surveillance.

This newsletter editorial explores the legal boundaries of dark web monitoring in 2025.

Drawing on UK, U.S. and international frameworks, it surveys the relevant legislation, highlights legal and ethical challenges and offers practical guidance for compliance and risk management.

The Case for Dark Web Monitoring

Modern enterprises face relentless cyber threats. Data breaches frequently surface first on the dark web, where criminals sell stolen credentials, compromised databases or pre‑built malware kits.

Dark web monitoring helps organisations detect breaches early, mitigate risks, protect brand integrity and ensure compliance with regulations like GDPR.

Dark web monitoring aims to reduce the time between breach and discovery.

A structured monitoring process involves identifying assets, choosing the right tools, mapping relevant sources, collecting data, matching patterns, validating authenticity and issuing real‑time alerts.

Continuous monitoring integrates these insights into a broader cybersecurity strategy and includes employee training and periodic reviews.

The business case is clear: early intelligence can prevent or limit financial loss, reputational damage and regulatory penalties.

However, it is important to emphasise that dark web monitoring should never justify illegal activities.

Privacy and Data Protection

GDPR, POPIA and HIPAA

Privacy laws form the first legal boundary for dark web monitoring. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the EU (retained in UK law post‑Brexit) and similar frameworks, such as South Africa’s Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA) and the U.S. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), impose strict obligations on organisations that process personal data.

Dark web monitoring should be conducted in a way that respects these regulations and ensures that personally identifiable information (PII) is handled appropriately.

In practice, this means identifying a lawful basis for processing (e.g., legitimate interest in protecting systems), minimising the amount of data collected, anonymising where possible and implementing robust data‑retention policies.

Under GDPR, organisations must also provide transparency about data processing and offer data subjects certain rights, including the right to access, rectify or erase their data.

While the dark web often contains illegally obtained PII, processing such information to alert customers or revoke credentials may be justified under the vital interests or legitimate interests grounds.

However, storing or disseminating the data beyond what is necessary could lead to heavy penalties.

POPIA and HIPAA impose similar obligations.

Health‑care providers using dark web monitoring to detect stolen patient records must handle any recovered data in accordance with HIPAA’s privacy and security rules.

They may also be required to notify affected individuals and regulators under U.S. state breach notification laws.

Data Retention and Bulk Personal Datasets

The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA) in the UK provides a statutory framework for data retention and surveillance.

Recent independent reviews propose creating a light‑touch regulatory regime for the retention and examination of bulk personal datasets (BPDs) where individuals have a low expectation of privacy.

The review recommends that placing datasets into the low/no privacy category should require approval by an independent Judicial Commissioner.

Another proposal involves amending the use of Internet Connection Records (ICRs) to facilitate target discovery.

These discussions illustrate that even governments must balance surveillance powers with oversight and privacy safeguards.

For private organisations, they highlight the importance of minimising data collection and obtaining clear authorisation when dealing with bulk datasets.

Unauthorised Access and Computer Misuse

Computer Misuse Act 1990 (UK)

The Computer Misuse Act 1990 (CMA) criminalises unauthorised access to computer systems.

The CMA, introduced after a high‑profile hacking case, has been amended several times but its core offences remain:

Section 1 is broad: it criminalises any attempt or achievement of access when the actor knows it is unauthorised.

This includes using another person’s credentials or exploring parts of a system without proper authority.

Because dark web monitoring often involves accessing closed forums or markets, organisations must ensure they do not violate this law.

For example, creating or buying fraudulent accounts to infiltrate a criminal marketplace could be deemed unauthorised access.

Similarly, scraping data behind loginwalls may be illegal if the terms of service prohibit such access.

Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (U.S.)

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) (18 U.S.C. § 1030) is the primary federal statute governing unauthorised computer access in the United States.

Enacted in 1986 and amended multiple times, the CFAA criminalises a variety of actions, including:

• Intentionally accessing a computer without authorisation or exceeding authorised access and obtaining information from a financial institution or government computer.

• Knowingly causing the transmission of code that damages a protected computer.

• Trafficking in passwords or similar items that facilitate unauthorised access.

• Extorting money by threatening to damage or obtain information from a computer.

The law originally applied to so‑called protected computers (e.g., government or financial institution systems), but amendments have expanded its scope so broadly that it now covers any computer used in or affecting interstate commerce.

The CFAA has been criticised for its vague definition of “unauthorised access,” but a 2021 Supreme Court decision (Van Buren v. United States) adopted a narrower interpretation, making it harder to criminalise violations of terms of service alone.

Nonetheless, organisations conducting dark web monitoring must avoid intentionally accessing non‑public computers without permission.

Criminalising Tools and Services

Both the CMA and CFAA have provisions that criminalise the distribution of tools or services designed for computer misuse.

Section 3A of the CMA (added by the Police and Justice Act 2006) targets those who make, supply or obtain articles for use in computer misuse offences.

Under the CFAA, trafficking in passwords or tools facilitating unauthorised access is illegal.

Companies should therefore evaluate their monitoring tools to ensure they are not inadvertently distributing or using illegal hacking utilities.

Surveillance and Intelligence Gathering

Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (UK)

The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA), sometimes dubbed the Snoopers’ Charter, consolidates and expands the surveillance powers of UK intelligence agencies and law enforcement.

It authorises the interception of communications, equipment interference (hacking), the acquisition and retention of communications data and bulk personal datasets.

The IPA allows the government to require service providers to intercept communications or retain data, effectively compelling private companies to assist surveillance.

Powers may only be exercised with a warrant approved by a Judicial Commissioner, but critics argue the criteria for warrants are subjective and enable mass surveillance.

Under the IPA, several authorities, including the Metropolitan Police, GCHQ, HM Revenue & Customs, the Financial Conduct Authority and the Serious Fraud Office, can access internet connection records (metadata showing which services an individual has connected to) without a warrant.

Therefore, this means that dark web monitoring can sometimes intersect with government surveillance.

While companies cannot lawfully perform targeted interception without a warrant, they may receive data or requests from authorities.

Cooperation with law enforcement should be handled carefully, ensuring that any disclosure complies with data protection laws and court orders.

U.S. Surveillance and Electronic Communications

In the U.S., surveillance law is governed by a patchwork of statutes, including the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and various state wiretap laws.

These laws regulate when government agencies can intercept communications, place restrictions on private interception and set standards for data retention.

Unlike the IPA, there is no single statute authorising broad bulk data collection.

However, under FISA and its amendments (e.g., Section 702), intelligence agencies may collect foreign communications data with assistance from service providers.

Organisations must be cautious not to engage in surveillance that could violate these laws; unauthorised interception of communications can result in civil and criminal liability.

Ethical and Operational Boundaries

Dark web monitoring must avoid entrapment, unauthorised access or interactions that could breach ethical boundaries.

Ethical considerations are just as important as legal compliance.

The following principles can help organisations set ethical boundaries:

1. Purpose limitation – Monitor only for clearly defined security purposes; avoid curiosity‑driven exploration of illicit content.

2. Minimisation – Collect the minimal amount of data needed to achieve the purpose and discard irrelevant information quickly.

3. Non‑intrusion – Do not facilitate or encourage illegal transactions or participate in activities that could constitute entrapment or provocation.

4. Transparency and oversight – Document monitoring activities, involve legal counsel and make sure senior leadership understands the methods and risks.

5. Security – Protect any data obtained from the dark web using strong technical controls and limit access to need‑to‑know personnel.

Authorisation and Consent

Before engaging in dark web monitoring, organisations should consider obtaining legal authorisation or consent.

Unauthorised access to certain areas of the dark web may violate laws and that obtaining explicit permission is crucial.

Authorisation may come in several forms:

• Terms of service – Some platforms allow research or monitoring if users agree to abide by certain rules. Review the terms before engaging.

• Client consent – If monitoring involves customer data (e.g., scanning for leaked employee credentials), obtain explicit consent through contractual clauses or privacy policies.

• Law enforcement coordination – Work with authorities to ensure monitoring efforts do not impede investigations or cross legal lines.

Note that many dark web marketplaces are criminal enterprises. Seeking consent from site operators is neither feasible nor desirable.

Instead, organisations should focus on ensuring that their own methods (e.g., using open search tools or threat‑intelligence feeds) do not involve unauthorised access.

Cross‑Border Challenges and International Cooperation

The dark web is not bound by national borders; servers and users may be located anywhere.

Cross‑border investigations therefore require cooperation between jurisdictions. The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime is the first international treaty addressing cybercrime.

It aims to harmonise national laws, improve investigative techniques and increase cooperation among nations.

As of June 2025, 80 states have ratified the Budapest Convention, while others (including India and South Africa) have signed but not ratified it.

Therefore, evidence or intelligence may need to be shared with foreign law enforcement under Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs).

Companies should ensure their monitoring activities comply with the laws of the jurisdictions in which they operate and where data is processed.

Different countries may restrict the use of anonymity tools or regulate encryption.

For instance, Russia and Iran have pressured ISPs to block the Tor network, while the United States has generally allowed Tor use.

China’s “Great Firewall” similarly blocks Tor relays.

Organisations with global operations must be aware of local restrictions and adapt their monitoring accordingly.

Incident Response and Notification Obligations

Dark web monitoring is part of a broader incident‑response strategy.

When a company discovers stolen credentials or confidential data on the dark web, it must act swiftly to mitigate harm.

Key steps include:

1. Validate the data – Ensure the leaked information is authentic and relevant.

2. Assess risk – Determine the potential impact of the leak on financial, operational and reputational aspects.

3. Contain and remediate – Reset compromised accounts, patch vulnerabilities, notify affected third parties and remove malicious listings. Real‑time alerts are essential.

4. Notify authorities and affected individuals – Under GDPR, HIPAA and many state breach‑notification laws, organisations must report breaches to regulators and notify individuals if there is a risk of harm.

5. Document and improve – Record actions taken, evaluate what went wrong and refine monitoring and security procedures.

Organisations should also consider cyber‑insurance coverage.

Policies often cover incident‑response costs and legal liabilities but may exclude events arising from certain unauthorised monitoring practices.

Reviewing policy exclusions in light of dark web monitoring is prudent.

Emerging Trends and Future Regulations (2025 and Beyond)

AI and Automated Threat Intelligence

Artificial intelligence is transforming cyber threat intelligence. Machine learning algorithms can sift through vast amounts of dark web data, identify patterns and even predict emerging threats.

However, AI introduces new legal questions.

Training models on illicitly obtained data could raise privacy issues under GDPR.

Moreover, using AI to interact autonomously with forums may blur the line between passive monitoring and active engagement.

Future regulations may address how AI tools may be used for threat intelligence and the accountability of decisions made by algorithms.

Post‑Quantum Encryption and Quantum Threats

Quantum computing promises to break many of today’s encryption schemes. As a result, there is growing interest in post‑quantum encryption.

Dark web actors may exploit quantum techniques sooner than expected to enhance anonymity or crack stolen data.

Regulatory bodies are beginning to discuss standards for post‑quantum encryption, and companies should monitor these developments.

Amendments to Surveillance Laws

The Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Act 2024 reflects ongoing efforts to refine UK surveillance law.

Independent reviews (such as the Anderson Report) suggest further reforms to create agility for intelligence agencies and law enforcement, including new regimes for bulk personal datasets and improved definitions of internet connection records.

Similar debates are happening in the U.S., where reauthorisation of Section 702 of FISA and proposals to limit data brokers are central topics in 2025.

These changes will affect how private companies cooperate with authorities and may impose new compliance requirements.

Global Data‑Transfer Restrictions

Cross‑border data flows are under increased scrutiny. The U.S. and EU recently adopted new data-transfer frameworks (e.g., the EU–U.S. Data Privacy Framework), but these face court challenges.

Simultaneously, Executive Order 14117 (February 2024) prohibits certain transfers of Americans’ bulk sensitive personal data to countries of concern and may require companies to vet foreign partners.

Dark web monitoring providers should watch these developments because sending threat intelligence abroad could trigger export controls or data‑localisation rules.

What challenges or questions do you face in this dark web monitoring space? Share your thoughts, experiences, or insights.